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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1410 
___________ 
 
BHIKHABHAI S. PATEL, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
         Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-680-340) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Steven Morley 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 3, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 10, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Bhikhabhai Patel seeks review of a final order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”).  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
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Patel, a citizen of India, arrived in the United States sometime in 2002 or 2003.  In 
2010, removal proceedings were initiated against him pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States without being 
admitted or paroled.  In September 2011, Patel, through counsel, conceded to the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that he was removable and not eligible for cancellation, 
adjustment of status, or asylum.  However, he moved for a continuance based on a June 
2011 policy memorandum by ICE Director John Morton (“Morton Memo”), which 
provides “guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to ensure that the agency‟s 
immigration enforcement resources are focused on the agency‟s enforcement priorities.”  
Patel argued that he should be granted a continuance to await implementation of the 
policy and determine whether it entitled him to some form of relief.  The IJ denied Patel‟s 
motion, finding his argument regarding potential relief pursuant to the Morton Memo too 
speculative, and ordered him removed to India.  Patel appealed, arguing that the IJ abused 
his discretion in denying a continuance.  The BIA dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse 
of discretion.  Patel thereafter filed a timely, counseled petition for review in this Court.    
We have jurisdiction under INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  An IJ may 
“grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.29.  An IJ‟s 
refusal to grant a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, Khan v. Att‟y Gen., 
448 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2006), and will be overturned only if the decision is arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law, see Hashmi v. Att‟y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008).  
“The question whether denial of a continuance in an immigration proceeding constitutes 
an abuse of discretion cannot be decided through the application of bright-line rules; it 
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must be resolved on a case by case basis according to the facts and circumstances of each 
case.”  Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
We agree with the BIA that the denial of Patel‟s motion for a continuance was not 
an abuse of the IJ‟s discretion.  Patel‟s argument regarding potential relief pursuant to the 
Morton Memo was speculative and could have led to an indefinite delay in the 
proceedings.  See Contreras v. Att‟y Gen., 665 F.3d 578, 587 (3d Cir. 2012) (“An IJ has 
no obligation to grant a continuance that would be essentially „indefinite‟ if there is „only 
the speculative possibility that at some point in the future‟ the alien‟s labor certification 
application will be approved.”) (quoting Khan, 448 F.3d at 235).  Although Patel asserts 
that he had “a very fair chance of prosecutorial discretion,” he provided no facts or 
evidence in support of that assertion.  He also failed to explain why a continuance of the 
removal proceedings was necessary to obtain the benefit of ICE‟s new internal policies 
regarding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  See Memorandum from John Morton, 
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors et al., 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement 
Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens at 3 
(June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-
discretion-memo.pdf (ICE attorneys may exercise prosecutorial discretion at any stage of 
the removal proceedings, including during administrative and judicial appeals); see also 
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483-85 (1999).   
Finally, to the extent Patel argues that the denial of his continuance request violated his 
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Fifth Amendment due process rights, he fails to establish that the IJ or BIA prevented 
him from presenting his case or that he suffered prejudice as a result.  See Khan, 448 F.3d 
at 235-36.  
Accordingly, the petition for review will be denied. 
